THEOLOGY

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Editorial

IT was once said of Campbell-Bannerman that he spoke "like a man who was happy in having an excellent case, not like a man with a cause". Britain during this century has had plenty of national spokesmen who have been happy in having an excellent case, but except in time of war not many who have spoken like men with a cause. What is the cause to which this country stands committed, to which it is dedicated or ought to be dedicated? If God has a special purpose for each nation that His providence brings into distinct existence, to what is He calling the British people now?

The question, whether formulated in these terms or not, seemed neither difficult nor pressing during the period of the *pax Britannica*. It was the obvious task of Britain to lead the world in industry and commerce, to guard the paths of the seas, to develop her empire, and to raise the standard of living of her people at home. There was more than enough to be getting on with. While the sense of a national or of an imperial mission may never have entered deeply into the consciousness of our people as a whole, still the conditions were there that induced a state of confident engagement in what was worth while. But now the position is different. Britain no longer leads the world in power; no longer has she an expanding economy or an expanding empire; no longer can she expect her domestic standard of living to be steadily raised; in fact it is very doubtful whether it can be maintained at its present level. This is a nation that has to adapt itself to changed fortunes and to a different role. The words of statesmen who use language that was appropriate to the old condition have now a hollow ring—whether it be the language of imperial magnificence or of material progress.

It is a time when the clerisy, if not yet the statesmen, should be examining the nation's history in order to see whether it has not been the bearer of a purpose or calling which still holds good, when the period of Britain's pre-eminent power has passed, because it originated before that and never depended on that alone. If it cannot be said that, especially during the last five years, either our intellectuals or our statesmen have written or spoken like men with a cause, it may be because they have not yet asked the right questions about Britain's history. But a notable essay of just the right kind has reached us now in Mr G. Kitson Clark's book, *The English Inheritance*.[1]

He calls it "an essay on the effects of the Christian religion on the English inheritance". What he has done is to disentangle from

[1] S.C.M. Press, 15s. The author deliberately confines himself to *English* history. It would be well if a similar book could come out of Scotland and Wales.

the vicissitudes of English history since the time of the Tudors the principles or values which it has been given to the English people to recognize, however imperfectly they have realized them. He recalls and describes with a wealth of illustration the experiences, movements, conflicts, and institutions through which the English gradually became aware of what mattered for them most and of what made a paramount claim upon their allegiance. We shall quote his main conclusion in a moment. It might seem commonplace or doctrinaire, were it not the conclusion of a very careful, honest, and critical survey of a complicated piece of history, out of which the conclusion emerges without being in any way forced. It must also be said that Mr Kitson Clark has succeeded to a remarkable degree in doing justice to the most heterogeneous and even contradictory ecclesiastical and political forces that have been at work in English history. If he had not at the outset declared what his own ecclesiastical and political attachments are, so that the reader may be on the look-out for any bias in those directions, they would hardly be detected. And the book is as free from the idolatry of nationalism as it is from the bias of party or sect. Here then is the author's main conclusion.

"The history of England", he says, "does seem to have some logic or internal consistency. It seems to embody the hammering out, the development, the betrayal, the re-explanation in terms still inadequate, the extension and at times the contraction of one great moral concept, the concept of freedom. The freedom of Englishmen was held to be the object of the English Law, it was the subject of the constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century. It was enforced, if also menaced, by the Puritan, claiming for himself a freedom which he believed to be endorsed by God. The Established Church believed that it protected freedom when it tried to check the forces of superstition and enthusiasm, and acknowledged the rights of human reason; the Dissenter believed that he vindicated it when he attacked the privileges of the Established Church. The manufacturer and the Liberal claimed it against the state in the nineteenth century, and the social reformer and the trade unionist against the manufacturer" (pp. 174 f.).

If the special calling of England is to work out in practice as well as in theory the meaning of freedom, if at no stage in its past history has it more than partially done what it was set to do, and if now it has come to a new phase of its traditional task and one that is more testing than any previous one, then we have here the makings not indeed of a happy case, but of a cause. For Christians it will be peculiarly testing. It is not Mr Kitson Clark's way to beat the Christian drum offensively or presumptuously. But he leaves the reader wondering very seriously whether the kinds of freedom towards which Englishmen have struggled in the past, and which have become at any rate their ideal inheritance, can in future make sense and stand upright apart from their final origination and sanction in the Law of God and in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. He assesses very fairly, neither complacently nor despairingly, what

survives among us of Christian conviction. It is not enough to justify any easy confidence; but it is enough to move a Christian Englishman to speak like a man with a cause.

The House Church and the Parish Church[1]

1 Corinthians i, 1 f.: "Paul . . . unto the Church of God which is at Corinth."

Philemon 1 f.: "Paul . . . to the Church in thy house."

The Church for the New Testament is always the Great Church, the Ecclesia of God, the Body of Christ. The Biblical writers always start there: they never define the Church as Congregationalism does (and as our own Anglican Article does when it begins: "*The* visible Church of Christ is *a* congregation of faithful men") in terms of the local unit, and then think of the universal Church as a federation of these units. But, while the Church is always the Great Church, it can nevertheless, and must, be embodied in units which can still be described as *the Church*—the Church as it takes expression "at Corinth", "in thy house". These units are not simply bits of the Church; they are the Body of Christ in its totality, as it exists in this cell. Each cell is a microcosm, on its own scale perfectly reproducing the whole. This is an immensely important point for the understanding of the doctrine of the local Church, and it is the truth which Congregationalism and our Articles have so magnificently grasped—even though it is the wrong place from which to start a definition.

What I want to do is to consider the relation which should exist between two levels of this Church-existence, between the Church as it comes to expression "at Corinth" and as it reproduces itself "in thy house"; or, in modern terms, between the parish Church and the cell- or house-Church.

The parish Church (and, needless to say, I am using "Church" here and throughout to describe not a building but a community) is something that is perfectly familiar. But the idea of the house-Church is one that needs clarifying.

There are two mistakes we can make in our thinking at this point, both of which derive from an untheological attitude of mind. The first mistake is to think of the house-Church as a purely temporary expedient: a makeshift arrangement characteristic of the earliest Church in Jerusalem or in any other mission area, an organization which serves until the parish Church can be constituted. (This line of thinking very soon betrays the insidious identification of the parish Church with a building of bricks and mortar!) And the second error is to think of the house-Church simply as an evangelistic weapon, a technique for getting at those on the frontier not yet ready to accept the full Christianity of the parish Church. It is, as it were, a half-way house for the semi-converted—taking Christi-

[1] The substance of an address given to Wells Theological College, November 17, 1949.

anity into the home or factory, through that later to pass men on to the full sacramental life of the Church.

But both these conceptions are untrue to the New Testament. For it, the Church in the house is not an *ad hoc* expedient: it is a theologically necessary part of the life of the Body. When St Paul writes: "Aquila and Prisca salute you much in the Lord, with the Church that is in their house";[1] or, from the other end: "Salute Prisca and Aquila . . . and the Church that is in their house";[2] or: "Salute the brethren . . . and Nymphas, and the Church that is in their (*RVM*: her) house";[3] he is not implying that these people were working in mission areas where a "parish" had as yet not been established (the places mentioned are in fact such well-settled centres as Ephesus, Rome and Laodicea); nor that these were semi-Christian outposts of the faith. He means, rather, that these were Churches within the parish Church, as to-day the parish Church is a Church within the diocese. Each colony of Christianity was honeycombed with smaller units.[4]

This idea of the cellular structure of each parish, reflecting exactly the cellular structure of each diocese, is something that has been grievously lost in the modern Church. We would never think of a diocese being an agglomeration of individuals or a federation of local organizations (such as the Mothers' Union or the Church Lads' Brigade), but always as an organic union of *parishes*. But on the smaller scale that is precisely how we *are* content to think. Our parishes are for the most part collections of individuals; or, if these are brought together, it is in organizations. These latter are not units of the whole Church in miniature, but sectional groupings founded on some specifically limited basis of sex, age, or shared interest. No one could possibly call them *Churches*, though they often try to act like Churches, and we have the theologically obnoxious practice of corporate Communions for special organizations and societies—as though anything other than a *Church* could celebrate the Eucharist. By contrast, the house- or cell-Church is essentially of the same mixture as the lump, except that the area of natural community is smaller (*e.g.*, a street-group) and may, in these days when communities are often not geographical at all, be outside the parish altogether (for instance, in an office or factory).

[1] 1 Cor. xvi, 19. [2] Rom. xvi, 3, 5. [3] Col. iv, 15.

[4] It would be a mistake, of course, to look in the N.T. for any clearly defined hierarchical structure of house, parish and diocese. However, in Col. iv, 15-6, St Paul obviously distinguishes between "the Church of the Laodiceans" and "the Church" within it that met at the house of Nymphas. In large centres, like Rome, there must have been a number of house-churches (as Rom. xvi, 5, 14, 15 suggests), which were destined themselves to become the nuclei of later parishes (C. H. Dodd, *Romans*, 237). How frequently these came together for a common Eucharist it is impossible to say. By the time of Justin Martyr they seem to have become well-defined "congregations" (*cf.* the quotation in Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, 421). The exact ecclesiastical organization of the Apostolic or any other age is unimportant; what is of theological significance is the application of the term *the Church*, with all the high doctrine that goes with it, to the smallest unit of Christian existence within the larger whole.

I believe that the theological recovery of this notion of the Church in the house (and again I do not mean primarily bricks and mortar; for the group may meet in the Church building) is one of the most important tasks of our generation. Whereas the organization is an optional extra, of the *bene esse* of the parish, I believe that the cellular structure of the Church will be rediscovered as a necessity of its life. It was what John Wesley meant when he insisted that every Methodist—that is to say, every methodical Anglican—must be a member of a class meeting. It is the kind of thing that is being reborn, this time outside the parish Church, in the movement of the Spirit described in *France Pagan?*. But the danger is that we shall miss the real *theological* significance of it all. It is easy to regard the house-Church simply as a technique for evangelism—which perhaps in the first place it normally is, since the Church lives not only for evangelism but by it. And then it is easy to go on, after reading such a book as *France Pagan?*, to say: "Well, the situation is very different here, and probably we don't need to employ such drastic methods." But, whether we need them as techniques for the unconverted or not, to take this attitude is to miss precisely what God is surely trying to say to this generation through them—namely, that here is something of theological necessity for the very *esse* of the Church and for the life of every member within it. We have a wholly wrong, and unbiblical, idea of the house-Church if we *define* it as something which is a half-way stage to the parish Church. Rather, it is a vital cell within the Body itself, which should be reflecting in microcosm the *whole* life and activity of the Community of Holy Spirit—*all* that St Paul meant by describing it as "the Church", the Great Church, in the house.

And within the Body it has a function which is irreplaceable. This can be described best, perhaps, in terms of the Johannine metaphor. The house-Church represents, so to speak, the tap-roots of the vine, the Church under ground, that of the life of the tree most closely in contact with the clinging soil of everyday existence: it is the tree as it is embedded in the deepest crevices and seams of the secular world. The cell-Church is what feeds new life into the parish Church, as the innumerable tap-roots nourish the stock of the vine. And then, from the parish, the Church can throw out its leaves and fruit in the great dioceses and provinces which cover the earth, and rear its head in the heavenly places as "the general assembly and Church of the first-born". But without the cell- or house-Church it becomes like those trees whose roots are all visible above the ground, which are fast losing living contact with the soil, either to take anything out of it or to put anything back into it.

So far I have simply worked out what I believe to be the theology of the Church in the house. I propose to conclude by illustrating the implications of this in one direction only, which is at once the most obvious and yet to the modern mind the most startling.

The cell-Church, being *the Church* as it is in the house, must reproduce the whole life of the Body, all the "marks" of catholicity —the Apostles' teaching and fellowship, the breaking of bread, and

the prayers. The first and the last, in the form of groups for Bible study and prayer, are well accepted marks of the Church in the cell. What I want to say will be concerned solely with the second—namely, the breaking of the bread. For the Eucharist is, *par excellence*, the pattern-action of the Church, that by which the *Koinonia* is constituted and by which it is to be recognized, whether it be in a Cathedral or a Gestapo prison. One should not be able to come across the Community at any level without finding the Communion.[1]

At once, I suppose, we are faced with the objection: "But how can a *bit* of the parish celebrate the Holy Communion? How can a few people, a house, take upon themselves the action of the whole Church?" That only goes to show how awry our doctrine of the Church has got. Ask another question: "How can the parish celebrate the Eucharist?" To us that seems obvious. But it was far from obvious to the Church of the early centuries, which inclined to hold that only the *diocesan* Eucharist, at which the bishop presided, could be valid. But that difficulty was overcome by the recognition that at every Eucharist, at whatever level, the whole Church is celebrating; and hence the prerequisite that a priest must preside, ordained and authorized as he is by the bishop to act in the name of the universal Church of God. It is always *the Church* which celebrates, be it the Church in the diocese, in the parish, or in the house. It is significant, perhaps, that when, on a recent occasion, I talked of the Christian community celebrating the Eucharist in the house, I was at once suspected of advocating lay celebration. So little do we remember to-day that the action of the Eucharist is *always*, at every level, the Christian community celebrating through the priest, and not the priest celebrating *for* a congregation.

That silent revolution which Dom Gregory Dix has analysed so

[1] It is impossible from the scanty evidence to be dogmatic about the existence of the Eucharist in the house-churches of the N.T. Acts ii, 46 ("and day by day, continuing steadfastly with one accord in the temple, and breaking bread at home") may reflect simply a temporary arrangement. But at least it seems clear here that *kat' oikon* must mean "at home" or "in every house" (*i.e.*, each group in their own household) and does not imply that, daily at any rate, the whole community (of over 3,000 souls) moved round for a corporate Eucharist "from house to house" (A.V.). There is no direct mention of later house-celebrations, but unless the significance of the words "*as oft as* ye eat this bread, and drink the cup" and "this do, *as oft as* ye drink it" had been quite lost, it is most improbable that the household, say, of Philemon did not break bread together eucharistically. Admission to a house as a religious unit would seem to have given the right to meet at its table for the Lord's Supper and to burial in the family vault (*cf.* C. H. Dodd, *Romans*, 237). The discussion in 1 Cor. xi appears clearly to be concerned with what might be called the parish or diocesan Eucharist, though naturally, like every Church service till the third century, it must have occurred in a private house.

The house-celebration has always been retained in the Church in some form—*e.g.*, in royal and episcopal chapels. Great houses had their chapels, where celebrations for the household of the Church in that place were allowed, with the proviso that these did not occur on Sundays and festivals and so destroy the parish Eucharist. The mission Church within a parish is, of course, a swollen form of the house-Church (as which, indeed, it often started), and some of their consecration deeds witness to the cellular structure of the parish by stipulating that they shall not be used for celebrations on great festivals.

devastatingly in his essay in the S.P.C.K. symposium, *The Parish Communion*—namely, the change in the Eucharist from being the action of the whole Body of Christ to something done *by* the clergy *for* the laity—is what above all the movement for the parish Communion is out to reverse. That is being slowly accomplished at the parish level on Sundays. But for week-day celebrations, the situation remains as it was in the Middle Ages. The low mass, with the priest celebrating either by himself or for a few individuals, against which the Orthodox Church has always set its face, is universal. The Reformers may have tried to make lay communion compulsory, whereas their predecessors only exhorted it, but, apart from the single act of communion, the service has remained, in Dix's words, "a purely clerical performance". "All that has changed is that instead of offering the sacrifice for the laity the function of the clergy is now to 'provide communion' for the laity."[1]

The only way back is to apply here all the theology of the Sunday Parish Communion and to rediscover the week-day Eucharist as *par excellence* the celebration of the Church in the cell, in the house. This would mean (and here I am deliberately flying a theological kite) that the present individualistic low mass must become gradually superseded by a number of house-celebrations, most probably in the evening, all of which would be gathered up in the parish Communion on Sundays. It is for such a priesthood that we ought perhaps more and more to be training—and, maybe, rethinking our whole conception of the ministry. *Where* these celebrations take place—in the Church or in the home—is largely irrelevant: it is *the community that celebrates them* that is important. But to such an extent have we lost our roots in the soil that the only way to recover the integral connexion of the eucharistic offering with daily work may be to take the whole thing right back into the midst of the sweat and muck it is meant to be offering and transforming.

Here are a few lines from a description of a mass celebrated at the end of a day by a priest-workman in a docker's home in France. "More beautiful than the flowers [brought by some of the dockers—'real flowers from a florist'] were the careful but heavy genuflections of this priest who had been working all day at the docks and whose movements evidenced the weights he had been carrying. The mystery of the Redemption is taking place *at the very spot where it is needed*. Outside, the seven children of the Valès family are playing, and when after our thanksgiving we meet in the court all hung with drying linen and old blankets being aired, life seems new to everyone."[2]

It is when the Eucharist is really taken back into life like that that we shall begin to rediscover many, many things we have forgotten. At the parish level, and still more at the cathedral level, it is bound, like every large-scale social action, secular or sacred, to become formal and stylized. That is how it should be. But that is a healthy development only if we are at the same time, at the level of the house-Church, knowing something which is not formal but

[1] *The Parish Communion*, 138.

[2] *France Pagan?*, 211.

genuinely spontaneous. We should clearly be missing something vital if the only meal we ever knew was a boiled-shirt dinner party or a Lord Mayor's banquet.

What will happen if the Eucharist is really lived back into the everyday soil-stained world only the Holy Spirit can say. I should be very much surprised, however, if we do not see its reintegration with the *Agape* meal, so that once more the eucharistic elements become something taken off the table "as they were eating". The special vestments, the special vessels, will either disappear at this level or be radically modified. (Incidentally, if the chalice and paten become the best "piece" that the household possesses it may make people realize how unworthy so much modern crockery is of the Lord's table, which is what every Christian table should be—and that goes for the whole setting and manners of the meal.)

Above all, the liturgy itself, when really taken down, will have to be built up again in a far simpler form to be suitable for the Church in the cell. It would seem that perhaps the bishops ought to be prepared to sanction almost unlimited experiment *at this level*, tied only to the four great "moments" of the primitive Eucharist (themselves based on the four Gospel actions: "took", "blessed", "brake", "gave"), namely the Offertory, the Thanksgiving Prayer, the Fraction, and the Communion; such experiment being subject, of course, to nothing unauthorized being done. I say *at this level*, for I am convinced that we are not, as a Church, in a position to revise our *parish* liturgy at this moment. That will have to come, if we agree with Dom Gregory Dix, as I think we must, that, despite all the efforts of the Reformers to make the Eucharist once more the service of the people, "Cranmer's Communion Service would seem to be only one instance among many of that 'atomized' individualistic piety which was common to the devotion of the Reformation and counter-Reformation alike in the sixteenth century".[1] Such a hard, and perhaps exaggerated, judgment would take too long to justify here (read Dix's whole essay). Anyhow it is not my present purpose, which is, rather, to insist that any new revision, whether one thinks it needs to be drastic or not, must come *from below* and not from above (as, for instance, it did in 1928). What is going to bring the real changes that are needed, and only these, is when men see that the liturgy as we now have it cannot be made adequately to sum up at the parish level on Sunday all that the Eucharist in the cell has come to mean to them on a week-day. There is no need to panic; this will be a process of generations. But it can happen at all only if at the level of the house-Church the Holy Spirit is really given free course. Why are we so frightened by this? We believe in sin; have we ceased to believe even more that if the Church is really being the Church it *can't* go wrong?

Let me end where I began, by insisting that all this must be seen as a *theological* rediscovery. It is not merely a technique for getting people into the Church, vitally important as it is as that. The cell is

[1] *The Parish Communion*, 140.

itself the Church, the Church in the basement, at the molecular level, in the smallest possible unit of Christian existence, whether it be among the dockers at Corinth or theological students at Wells. Indeed, a theological college (and particularly perhaps this one with its house-structure), so far from being "above" this sort of thing, would seem to be one of the most obvious places in which to start trying to live out what it means to be a house-Church. One has in such an institution a relative independence, and can count, presumably, on a tolerably high level of theological awareness. It might be hoped from such a centre eventually to disseminate a considerable influence, and perhaps to work out the kind of liturgy appropriate to this basement level of Christian living (though, of course, it would be a very different liturgy from that suitable, say, for a group of dockers).

Finally, a personal experience, for what little it is worth. During the years of its existence the parochial cell of which I was a member did, on one or two occasions, seek to express the pattern of Christian living which we knew together in a cell-celebration. It was only a very tentative beginning. It was done in the Church building and in what one might call the "parish" setting, but with an order which, though written for quite another occasion, was composed very largely from the early liturgies to stress the corporate offering. It was essentially an experiment in the Holy Spirit, and went only a very short way. But I think that everyone there those evenings, however they expressed it or could not express it, went away conscious of having been present at something very primitive, almost eschatological, and something which has changed our understanding of the Eucharist ever since. It is perhaps *an* essential element of the Christian Passover that it too should be eaten "in haste", when there is not the leisure for set ceremonial, but among the tables and chairs of the home, by men who, like the Israelites of old, must go on their way in the morning. Of course there is the place for all the richness and glory of the High Mass, the parish and cathedral Eucharist: indeed, let us make it as rich and colourful as we can. But as we come to it to pray, as we do in this week's collect, for God's "*household* the Church", may it vibrate with all those overtones of meaning brought to it by every member of the congregation from the Fellowship as he knows it in the Church of his own cell and house!

J. A. T. Robinson.

American Letter: No. 7

THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION

I.—When the General Convention of the Episcopal Church met at San Francisco in 1949 there was presented the triennial report on the state of theological education in that Church. To those of sensitive and discerning ear and eye there appeared in outline a critical situation of the greatest urgency.

All the facts and figures pointed toward a double dilemma. On

one hand there was an ample and increasing number of men applying for training in the seminaries. The seminaries were full to the point of overcrowding in some places; about 750 students for the ministry in the 10 institutions whose total maximum capacity is less than 800. On the other hand, the slogan to-day is "clergy shortage". One study made of clergy needs during the next five years puts the figure at 2,000. If the seminaries graduated during the five-year period 250 men annually, an extremely optimistic figure, there would still be a gap of about 800 vacancies. As a matter of fact, for the past five years the average rate of retirement (185 to 190) through illness, death, old age, etc., from the active ministry has exceeded the number of men graduating from the seminaries 3 to 2.

Why don't the seminaries step up the number of graduates by admitting more men and by increasing their faculties, buildings, and other equipment? Here is the second crucial dilemma. Although the capital resources and annual income of the Episcopal Church have been steadily increasing, the seminaries have been barely able to hold their own. Endowments which were adequate fifty or twenty-five years ago do not provide sufficient income to meet operating expenses to-day. Not only has there been a decrease in endowment revenues and an increase in costs due to general inflation, but education, all education including theological, is each year more expensive.

Enormous sums have been raised in the last few years for "reconstruction and advance", for "world relief", for new and additional church buildings, for overseas and home missions, etc., but little or nothing has been done up to now to lighten or even mitigate the crippling financial burdens of the seminaries. They are the "bottleneck" in meeting the need of the Church for more and better-trained clergy.

However, for the first time the problem is being discussed, and as a result of General Convention action there is official cognizance of the situation and the beginning of a study of an over-all strategy and development.

II.—All the seminaries of the Episcopal Church are autonomous institutions in the sense that none is subsidized by or incorporated into any ecclesiastical structure, diocesan, provincial, or national. This is true even of General Theological Seminary, although it is chartered by and has a certain number of its trustees elected by General Convention.

The ten institutions of the Episcopal Church are variously known as "seminaries", "theological schools", and "divinity schools". They differ in location, size, structure, and tradition (theological and liturgical) even more widely than the terminology used. Five of them are stretched along a 400-mile track on the eastern seaboard: the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, Mass.; the Berkeley Divinity School in New Haven, Connecticut; the General Theological Seminary in New York City; the Philadelphia Divinity School; and the Virginia Theological Seminary in Alexandria, across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C. In the central south there

is at Sewanee, Tennessee, the School of Theology of the University of the South—usually designated simply as "Sewanee". Three theological schools are in the midwest (so-called): Bexley Hall, a part of Kenyon College in Gambier, Ohio; Nashotah House in the small village of the same name in Wisconsin; Seabury-Western Theological Seminary in Evanston, Illinois (a suburb of Chicago), the largest of the Church seminaries west of the Atlantic coast and a merger of Seabury Divinity School, once located in Minnesota, and the Western Theological Seminary, originally established in Chicago. Two thousand miles farther west at Berkeley, California, is the Church Divinity School of the Pacific.

Several of the seminaries are affiliated or have close relations with neighbouring universities: Episcopal Theological School with Harvard, Berkeley Divinity School with Yale, Philadelphia Divinity School with the University of Pennsylvania, Seabury-Western with Northwestern University, and Pacific with the University of California. Although there is some interchange between General in New York City and Columbia, etc., it is not actually located in a university or college community.

General Theological Seminary and Virginia are the two largest, having new enrolments of about 150. Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge with about 100 students and Seabury-Western with 80 are third and fourth, respectively, in size. The other institutions run about 60 students or less.

It should be noted that the theological schools of the Episcopal Church in this country are in a sense graduate institutions. Admission is normally open only to men who are college or university graduates with an A.B. degree or its equivalent. This is not to say that the standard or level of courses offered to students preparing for the ministry is of an advanced or graduate study character. They are in many instances on a lower level than comparable offerings in theology at the ancient universities of England.

The normal course is three years leading to the degree of Bachelor of Divinity or Bachelor in Sacred Theology. The difference between these two degrees is only in name. In order to be eligible for a degree it is expected that the student will maintain a certain minimum grade in his courses, pass satisfactorily the prescribed examinations of a general or comprehensive nature, and meet other requirements (*e.g.*, the writing of a thesis and/or completion of work in some one special or elective field) according to the policies of the various institutions. In some cases exegesis of the Greek text of the New Testament is required. Students fulfilling the requirements of the three-year course, but not of the degree, are granted a diploma of graduation.

III.—The curriculum of the seminary in this country follows for the most part the traditional theological "quadrivium"—biblical, historical, and theological studies plus practical theology. This alignment of courses is not entirely a matter of tradition. It is due also to the requirements of the general canons of the Church as they pertain to prescribed examinations. The canonical examinations

operate as a determinative factor in shaping the theological curriculum and one that cannot be avoided. This does not mean that the theological schools are merely "cramming" schools for the canonical examinations, although, sadly enough, they are all too frequently regarded as such by students, diocesan examiners, and bishops.

Perhaps a few comments on the theological curriculum will not be amiss. The whole matter is the subject of rather widespread discussion at the moment and in some quarters the object of considerable dissatisfaction.

The first problem arises as a result of the compulsive urge for specialization, characteristic of all education in this country, which has led to the atomization of theological knowledge. The average teacher in a theological school has been trained to be an expert in the rather narrow field of his "speciality" and has not had much interest in anything beyond this inevitably limited horizon. This tendency toward unlimited fission has been catalysed by the struggle for autonomy in each of the major theological fields.

As one might expect in these circumstances, the hapless theological student has been unable to achieve an integrated or synthetic viewpoint. The growing recognition of this weakness has brought about a variety of academic devices to assist students in arriving at a more comprehensive understanding of their studies. Comprehensive or general examinations, tutorial guidance in various forms, interdepartmental seminars, etc., have been adopted with some success.

Another concern arises from the relation of the "theoretical" disciplines (biblical, historical, etc.) to the "practical" studies. The characteristically activist spirit of this country has been reflected in the theological curriculum. Two things have happened. First, pastoral theology as traditionally understood has virtually disappeared. In its place have been substituted "methods-courses" or training in skills. These have come to a place of high priority and dominant position in many non-Episcopalian theological schools. An examination of the catalogues of a large number of such institutions shows listings of practical courses equal in number to the total of all the other departments! After all, if our universities devote a good part of their resources to training in animal husbandry, hotel operation, meat cutting, etc., it is not surprising that the theological schools should include such matters as business methods for the small church, administration of the Sunday school (elementary), administration of the Sunday school (secondary), worship methods for youth groups, the choir camp, etc. It is fair to say that this trend has been resisted to a great degree by seminaries of the Episcopal Church. Here the controlling influence of the canonical requirements has been helpful. The professional or "trade" school ideal has made but little headway in the Episcopal theological schools.

The second disturbing feature of the practical curriculum is seen in the fact that it has succumbed in a great degree to allied secular concerns. Being rootless, or at the most only loosely attached to the traditional theological disciplines, the "methods-courses" have found their guiding principles in the wholly secular social sciences. Homi-

letics has become rhetoric and psychology; religious education has become pedagogical method and psychology; evangelism has become public relations or radio programming and psychology; worship has become architecture, art, music, principles of æsthetics, and psychology, etc. Once admitting the validity of the claim for autonomy of "practical theology" there is no foreseeable end to the chain reaction.

Out of the welter of experimentation there has appeared one development in the area of practical training which has commended itself more and more to seminary faculties. This is the required "field work" or "clinical training" program during the summer months. Under the "field work" program students may be assigned to work in professionally supervised *church* projects in rural areas, among minority racial groups (Negro, American Indian, etc.), or in industrial centres. The experience designated as "clinical training" is had usually in *non-church* institutions such as hospitals, psychiatric clinics, welfare agencies, social service centres, prisons, etc. The educational value of such experiences is dependent entirely on competent supervisors of Christian orientation, of whom there are not too many. In the earlier days of the clinical training program there was a tremendous and uncritical enthusiasm which led all too often to the student's feeling that he had been trained as a junior psychiatrist or penal expert or what have you. A more cautious appraisal of the situation is bringing about a preservation of the real values of such an experience and a reduction in the self-frustrating elements.

The opportunity for graduate study in theology, to turn our attention to another but related aspect of theological education, is quite limited in the seminaries of the Episcopal Church. Only one of our "accredited" institutions is really qualified to offer the doctorate in theology. A number of seminaries have programs leading to master's degrees, but these are of varying worth. Relatively few have the faculty, library facilities, and other resources to make graduate study for even the second degree of much value. Accordingly, most of our clergy who are interested in graduate study *per se* or who are preparing for university or seminary teaching enroll in one of the larger interdenominational or university graduate schools such as Union Theological Seminary in New York, the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, or Yale Divinity School.

The organization of the curriculum and the teaching procedures are of course of minor importance in a theological school when compared with the basically determinative factor, the teaching staff or faculty. This is an ambiguous situation in the Episcopal Church.

On the positive side it can be said that the teachers in the seminaries, particularly those occupying professorial chairs, are as well trained, as competent, and of as high repute as men holding comparable positions in universities or in theological schools of other religious bodies. Certainly they are devoted to their work and religiously committed. In most theological seminaries it is required that a full professor has an earned doctorate in his field; and in all

cases it is the ideal, I suppose. But just as important is the expectation that the seminary teachers shall exhibit qualities of personal, moral, and spiritual leadership. And, on the whole, they do.

The less satisfactory side of the picture is the limited number of qualified teachers. In the field of biblical studies the scarcity is most noticeable. The long and gruelling years required for mastery of the necessary languages, textual apparatus, and critical method have apparently discouraged any large number of young men from undertaking preparation for teaching in the biblical field. Some have felt, evidently, that the disciplines could be short-cut and it was easy to become quite directly a "biblical theologian".

Not unrelated to the shortage of really first-rate faculty men is the fact that in most instances seminary teachers are underpaid as compared with salaries received by clergy in parochial work or with salaries received by teachers in secular institutions. Moreover, the seminary faculties are overworked in the sense that but little time is available to most men for continuing independent study and creative writing. Energies are dissipated in meeting the demands of a teaching schedule (lecture and tutorial) and manifold other academic responsibilities. This latter situation bears directly on the problem of the lack of productive scholarship in the Episcopal Church in the U.S.A. Little or no contribution of weight is made to theological thinking by the parish clergy or even members of our religious orders. It is simply assumed that that is the business of "theological teachers". The result is that the theological faculties are supposed to do the writing *and* the teaching. Under the pressure of the daily details the writing, and perhaps the prevenient study and thinking, do not get done.

IV.—Reference has been made to examinations prescribed by the general canons of the Church. Although the subjects are set by canon, the examinations are drawn and given by diocesan boards of examining chaplains. This means that there is much latitude in the form, manner, and standard of examination. Variables entering into individual diocesan examinations are competence of the examiners and their particular interests or hobbies, the theological tradition of the diocese, the urgency of need for clergy, and on occasion the influence, direct or indirect, of the bishop.

As a guide to diocesan examiners, as well as for students, there is issued from time to time the *Syllabus of Theological Studies*. This is by way of suggestion and is not canonically mandatory. Even if the syllabus were followed quite literally there would still be a large open area for individual and personal emphases.

The syllabus is prepared by the *Joint Commission on Theological Education*, a committee representing the seminaries, the examining chaplains, and the Church at large. It is appointed by General Convention. The functions of the J.C.T.E. are mainly study, report, and counsel. It has no legislative or executive authority. Nevertheless it does exercise considerable influence and has undoubtedly led the way in recent years in raising the standards and procedures of theological education for the Episcopal Church.

V.—To summarize, it can be said that on the whole the situation is healthy and that most of the problems will be met as there grows in time greater understanding with consequent financial support. More men are in the seminaries to-day than ever in our history. Even more men are needed than can now be accommodated.

In terms of buildings and other physical facilities, in view of the limited number of qualified faculty, and taking into account the location of our present schools, it would seem that future development ought not to be merely vertical expansion. There are one or two areas of the country where new seminaries should be established and some of our present seminaries might well be strengthened by merging with each other. This latter point is not a plea for mere "bigness". But there is a size below which sound administrative, financial, and educational practice is difficult, if not impossible. Despite the commitments, emotional involvements, traditions, sensitive feelings of alumni, etc., of the various seminaries, a carefully planned strategy for the whole Church would be welcomed by most seminary officers and trustees.

ALDEN DREW KELLEY.

The Humane Behaviourism of Professor Gilbert Ryle[1]

WHY should readers of THEOLOGY be interested in a book of general philosophy? Three reasons may be given. *The Concept of Mind* is supremely readable, and is already being read by many who are not professional philosophers. Secondly, it is more persuasive by far than most naturalistic accounts of human behaviour, because it does not start from some dogmatic theory, *e.g.*, of mechanical determinism which declares that whenever we think or plan what is "really" happening is something quite different. Professor Ryle starts, not from what the anatomists and physicists discover, but from how we all talk and behave when we are not philosophizing, and he is controlled throughout by the language of ordinary folk. And thirdly, it is important to forestall those Christians, and others, who, hearing that "Ryle has disproved the existence of the soul", may either conclude that the Christian citadel has fallen or rush to defend an obsolete and ruinous line of trenches.

Professor Ryle's object is to expose and destroy what he describes "with deliberate abusiveness as the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine". The modern formulations of the error go back (as usual) to poor old Descartes, who, realizing that science after Galileo was committed to describing material systems in mechanical terms, attempted to salvage the freedom of will and thought by describing them in paramechanical terms: "If bodies were bits of clockwork, minds must be bits of not-clockwork."

Professor Ryle's method is to show that the postulation of a "mind" distinct from the body, the theatre of occurrences which run

[1] *The Concept of Mind*, by Gilbert Ryle. Hutchinson (12s. 6d.).

parallel to and interact with overt bodily processes, is useless, for it solves no problems; unnecessary, for we can, and do, discuss and deal satisfactorily with ourselves and each other without calling in any such thing; and illogical, including as it does a whole tangle of "category mistakes". (An illustration of a category mistake would be the treating of a whole as on a level with its parts, and another would be mixing up "cause" in the sense of a preceding occurrence with "cause" in the sense of a disposing condition.)

All students of philosophy are familiar with some at least of the innumerable attempts that have been made ever since he wrote to join together what Descartes had put asunder; and readers or hearers of the recent broadcast talks on *The Physical Basis of Mind* will have noticed how many of the speakers are embarrassed by the apparent impossibility of finding the "gap" between the mental and physical, and by the manifest impossibility of bridging it if it were found. Professor Ryle's concluding talk is a summary of his own solution, which suffers, however, from an overdose of parables.

To return to *The Concept of Mind*: Professor Ryle says nothing about neurones, brain surgery, and the rest. The word "brain" does not occur even in his index. He starts from how we all habitually talk and think. We see things, describe one another's behaviour, distinguish successful from unsuccessful activities, attribute motives, give reasons (of many different kinds), take part in arguments and come to conclusions, and in general conduct and estimate operations of all kinds, without supposing or needing to suppose that we are *really* perceiving sense-data, or inferring to and from ghostly mental processes which parallel our overt behaviour. *E.g.*, "intelligent" applies to actions of many kinds, and involves, as well as something said about the present action, hypothetical statements, which can be checked, about what else of the kind the agent could or does do. It does not imply that he is doing two things at once, viz. doing something which we can see and thinking something which we cannot see. Thinking, arguing, "making judgements", and the rest are processes which we can carry out in public (by writing or talking) or, at a certain stage of sophistication, in private. What happens is essentially the same in both cases.

Professor Ryle shows extraordinary insight in dealing with the many varieties of overt behaviour, and he succeeds in showing that when we normally think and talk about each other we refer either to overt behaviour or to tendencies and other dispositions which are not parallel inaccessible episodes in "the mind", because they are not episodes at all. Therefore they do not need an immaterial world in which to take place, and the substantives, such as "the will", by which we label them do not refer to objects of any kind. To take our own illustration: to say a man is charitable or has great charity is to indicate how he usually behaves, and how he may be expected to behave, in an indefinite variety of situations. What we actually *mean* by charity can be explained only by "unpacking" it into hypothetical statements, and if we want to show that So-and-so is charitable, we quote a sufficiency of incidents. 1 Cor. xiii is part of the

unpacking, and preaching from that passage carries the process further.

In this crucial chapter on "Dispositions and Occurrences" Professor Ryle agrees that in other cases there is a third class of indicative sentences which assert attributes of objects. In discussing minds, however, he speaks as if occurrences and dispositions between them cover the whole logical field. The point might be pressed home, and the assertion made that without some substratum of fact the hypothetical statements wrapped up in the dispositional ones are hanging in the air, and that that is exactly where metaphysics should come in. But since it is unlikely that some dispositions need no support and others do, the question is unlikely to be settled by adducing additional instances.

Professor Ryle exerts himself to persuade us that there are no episodes to which we have "privileged access". He puts up a sort of competition between introspection and common observation. Some philosophers have claimed that our knowledge of our own minds is in the nature of the case complete and unerring: but in fact much of our observation about ourselves is as reliable or unreliable as our observations of other people and depends on the same methods. We find out whether we ourselves have added up correctly by adding up again, just as we find out whether anyone else has. We convict ourselves of laziness by noticing that last week's letters are still unanswered, and not by "looking into our own minds" and trying to detect "laziness" there. And so we are comforted for the loss of "privileged access" by assurances that our knowledge of ourselves is just as good as our knowledge of other people. A favourite method of persuasion is the use of analogies, prefaced by "somewhat as if" or "this is not the same as". *E.g.*, "Mind is not the name of another person, working or frolicking behind an impenetrable screen" . . . the perceiving process is often thought of as like a person shut up inside an opaque tent, able to notice dints on the canvas, and trying to infer from the dints what objects if any cause them. . . . The charm of Professor Ryle depends on these innumerable illustrations, parallels and analogies, often lively, humorous, and close to common speech. But there is cause for wariness too. We have such fun chasing the hares (which were introduced by the remark that they are no species of foxes) that the original fox has quietly returned to his earth.

To take an example: what happens when you have a mental image? At first sight a mental image seems to be among the "somethings" to which we have privileged access, and whose status we are trying to decide. But (i) it is not a picture like a photograph hung on a ghostly wall, it is not a sight of a private cinema show, it isn't *anywhere*, inside my head or outside, it isn't a faint impression, it isn't any sort of picture, any more than a faked murder is any sort of murder; nor is "seeing" it any variety of seeing. (ii) Imagining means lots of other things besides having mental images. There is no nuclear operation of imagining, such as is often identified with having things in the mind's eye. "A child imagines he is a bear; he

roars, he pads round the floor, he gnashes his teeth and pretends to sleep in what he pretends to be a cave." He does not "see" his hands as covered with fur. We go on, most amusingly, about playing bears, shamming dead, acting on the stage, mocking other actors, sham fighting, clowning, etc.; then to having tunes running in one's head, and imagining Helvellyn. In all these it is convincingly shown that having a mental image is only a part, and usually not the most important part, of knowing how things go, or look, or sound.

After all this we feel we have been distracted from the original question, which obstinately recurs. "But, dash it all, *I* saw it (in my mind's eye), I felt that toothache, I *was* intending to annoy when I sneezed (because I remember that I was). No doubt you can form your opinion of my state of mind by means of various overt tests; and when you talk about me, or I about myself, we mean a lot more than describing private mental occurrences. But there are such occurrences. I can't observe them (which is true in the most useful sense of 'observe'); but I did have them, and you can't have these ones!"

Professor Ryle does not of course deny these obvious facts, but he has a marked preference for discussing those mental activities whose outward aspects are the most interesting part. He is always playing chess (which, they say, can be competently done by one of those electronic machines) or doing long-division (which the machines can do much better than we can). If he day-dreams it is about gardening or doing something, and he is very soon pottering round the garden at the very least. He talks in preference to thinking, and when he reasons he is making out a case, being "alert, careful, critical, ingenious, or logical". (Needless to say, I am not talking about episodes in Professor Ryle's private life!)

The proper use of logical concepts, such as "inferring", "judging", and the rest, belongs to the articulation of public or publishable arguments; they do not describe hidden mental processes carried out, *e.g.*, by Plato once and reproduced by us when we follow the argument. This seems to be both true and important, and the more strictly logical the argument the more nearly this description covers the facts. A whole lot of phantom operations can be disposed of this way. The processes of working out an argument or building up a theory are extremely varied, and many of them are gone through in public, *e.g.* in the actual collection and sorting of evidence and all kinds of "trying it out". Professor Ryle shows great insight in describing these, and also in the analysis of subjective-sounding words like "mood" and "emotion".

And yet, amidst all our admiration and gratitude, we feel a lack. It isn't just that he does not put every human activity into one book. It is rather that the things he leaves out have claims to be thought particularly significant.

Professor Ryle does not, though novelists and poets do, talk about people falling in and out of love, contemplating the Wye a few miles above Tintern Abbey, still less (as he himself often says after a negative) adoring, repenting and saying their prayers. When

Wordsworth said "the sounding cataract haunted me like a passion" he was not merely avowing a tendency to moon about near waterfalls, to behave restlessly indoors after heavy rain, and so on. When he recorded feeling "a sense sublime Of something far more deeply interfused, Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns . . ." he meant to be saying something about his own mind, and also something significant about the world outside himself. There is more in imagination as the poet understands it than is referred to in Professor Ryle's chapter with that name; and it is curious that such a verbal virtuoso should apparently be opaque to the most exciting use of words or at least should not discuss it.

This suggests the further question, whether how modern educated Englishmen talk really provides a sufficient clue to metaphysical questions. A Chinese or Indian Ryle is a contradiction in terms; but there have been Hindu philosophers who were equally alive to the nuances of their own vocabulary, and they have moved inwards and not outwards from the basic experience of being men, with totally different results. The mechanistic behaviourists at the other extreme describe everything else in language drawn from the laboratory.

Professor Ryle himself is not unwilling to be described as a Behaviourist, but it is behaviourism with a difference. "Man need not be degraded to a machine by being denied to be a ghost in a machine. He might after all be a sort of animal, namely, a higher mammal. There has yet to be ventured the hazardous leap to the hypothesis that perhaps he is a man."

If Professor Ryle could persuade us that his account is complete and covers all the facts there would be nothing to worry a Christian. We should simply have to acknowledge that the concrete human being, unitary body-and-brain, the living creature that we recognize in our friends and in ourselves, occupying space, being born, growing up and dying, is even more wonderful than we had thought. The doctrine of an immortal soul inhabiting, or in some way joined to, the body has indeed been an accepted part of the Christian description of man since long before Descartes; we can trace its roots to Plato and the Greeks, to Hebrew notions of "spirit" or "breath", and to whatever primitive animism came before them all. It would not follow that the Church's adoption of current anthropologies committed us to accepting them for all time, any more than the corresponding cosmological pictures, which after a mortal struggle we have surrendered. Many Christians would even now echo the words of good Bishop Watson of Llandaff: "Hoping as I do for eternal life through Jesus Christ, I am not disturbed at my inability closely to convince myself that the soul is, or is not, a substance distinct from the body." It may well turn out to be something of a misfortune that the Greek formulas lay ready to hand and offered an escape from the "cruder" paradoxes of Judaic faith. Many theologians, Dr Quick amongst them, have been reminding us that the Christian faith declares that Jesus died, not seemed to die, and that we die too; that for St Paul "the flesh" includes "the mind" and everything that we commonly mean by personality. We are being

recalled by New Testament scholars to the irretrievable "this-wordliness" of the apocalyptic hope, in the sense that it is this world which is to be transformed, and that the life of the world to come is in part present already. Christianity has been declared to be "the most materialistic of the great religions", and we have been reminded by many voices, and still more by unpleasant events, that a predominantly other-worldly idealistic Christianity evokes the Marxist version of a heaven on earth to redress the balance. And even Dr Farrer has been showing how inspiration takes place, in part at least, in the very act of writing.

The Greek notion of the naturally immortal, detachable soul has, to say the least, complicated our picture of what happens after death, and it has added a nightmare horror, as Mr C. S. Lewis reminds us, to the teaching of the New Testament about the everlasting bonfire.

Thus it is surely providential that the Creed does not speak of the immortality of the soul, but of the resurrection of the body. Nor is there any need to be embarrassed, as psychology, physiology, and the allied sciences make it ever more clear that they are using their various techniques to explore the same thing, that still mysterious thing, which we are and which we meet in our neighbours.

For it still is mysterious, this thing, which thinks and agonizes, loves, and prays, and contemplates beauty and creates it, and which dies. It is true that most of the time we are not conscious of the mystery; we are too busy doing things, getting things, competing, arguing, or, as Professor Ryle would say, just chatting. There is a mystery about personal identity, and it is not dissipated by saying it is due to trying to use "I" as a name. Nor is it due to the fact that our memory can never quite catch up with ourselves. There is a mystery about "now", a mystery about the world, a mystery about matter, all the more mysterious if indeed it is capable of behaving as it does in Professor Ryle, Shakespeare, and St Francis, and, for the matter of that, in the starry heavens and big and little fishes.

The Hindu contemplating the All, Wordsworth recalling the light that never was on sea or land, the plain man giving glory to God, anyone who has been moved by "a sunset touch, a chorus-ending from Euripides" or from the B minor Mass—all these witness by their behaviour to a mystery which cannot be argued or ridiculed or smoked or chatted away. It is this mystery which, once recognized, provides, in Dr Farrer's phrase, the "bridgehead of seriousness" on which religion and theology are based.

We shall continue to conduct mental operations, and we shall sometimes, though with more care perhaps, use the word "mind" as the subject in sentences referring to ourselves and each other as conducting them. We shall continue to pray, and worship our Creator, and praise Him for the mystery of being, into which our own being gives us a partial but sufficient insight; we shall continue to use, but with due caution, the words "soul" and "spirit" as the doer of some of the things we do, whose outward showing may be merely a getting up and down, a making of stylized gestures and a repeating of ritual words, as inexplicable from outside as a concert in progress

is to a man born deaf. But for those who have ears to hear, it is the entrance into a world which, whether outer or inner, mental or physical, both at once or neither, is still so real to those who know it that they laugh when anyone professes to explain that there is no music there, but only vibrations, or no meaning, but only sounds; no God, but only the echo of our desperate self-encouraging soliloquial chat. Professor Ryle does not profess to do that, nor, I believe, would he wish to.

T. R. Milford.

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CORRESPONDENCE

BAPTISM AND CIRCUMCISION

To the Editor of Theology.

Dear Sir,

The findings of the Oxford Conference of Evangelical Churchmen on "Baptism To-day" (*The Times*, May 31, 1950) include the statement: "Infant baptism, following naturally from the admission of children into the old covenant by circumcision, also fully accords with the principle of the new covenant of grace."

In the statement as a whole, though myself a Baptist, I find much to welcome, but I cannot help regretting this old, and I had hoped out-moded, appeal to circumcision. I suggest that the alleged analogy is unfounded, and would be shown to be so by that "more radical examination of the theology of infant baptism" for which the Conference called.

The argument apparently is that baptism has taken the place of circumcision, and that as circumcision was the sign and seal of the covenant of God with Abraham, so baptism is the sign and seal of "the new covenant of grace" in Christ. The covenant with Abraham, to be sealed by the circumcision of every male, is recorded in Gen. xvii, 1-14. The main emphasis is on the conveyance of Canaan to Abraham's descendants, who were to be attested as such by circumcision, which would ensure them a place within the national covenant. Abraham entered the covenant of grace, not by circumcision, but by obedience to God's call to leave Ur of the Chaldees. As St Paul says, faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness, "not in circumcision, but in uncircumcision: and he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had while he was in uncircumcision: that he might be the father of all

them that believe, though they be in uncircumcision" (Rom. iv, 9-11). In other words, circumcision could be a seal of the covenant of grace only where faith already existed. Circumcision followed and did not precede the faith of Abraham. For his descendants the rite was merely a mark of national separation.

"It [circumcision] was nothing more than a ratification of Abraham's faith. Faith was the real motive power; and as applied to the present condition of things Abraham's faith in the promise had its counterpart in the Christian's faith in the fulfilment of the promise (*i.e.*, in Christ). . . . The true descendants of Abraham were not so much those who imitated his circumcision (*i.e.*, all Jews, whether believing or not) but those who imitated his faith (*i.e.*, believing Jews and believing Gentiles)" (Sanday and Headlam, *Romans ad loc.*).

In his *Aids to Reflection* S. T. Coleridge, after dismissing the argument for infant baptism from the baptisms of households, writes: "Equally vain is the pretended analogy from circumcision, which was no sacrament at all, but the means and mark of national distinction, nor was it ever pretended that any grace was conferred with it or that the rite was significant of any inward or spiritual operation."

The only passage in the New Testament where circumcision and baptism are mentioned together is Col. ii, 11-12. St Paul tells his readers that they do not need the circumcision of the flesh, because they have reecived the circumcision of the heart. The bodily rite of circumcision is the type of this spiritual Christian circumcision, this cleansing of the heart (*cf.* Deut. xxx, 6: "The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart"). What is put in the place of the old circumcision is not baptism but this inward and spiritual circumcision. Baptism follows upon this change of heart.

The practice of the apostolic Church does not support the idea that baptism takes the place of circumcision. Circumcised Jews, including St Paul himself, were baptized. Apparently Christian Jews were encouraged by the apostles to continue the practice of circumcising their children. More remarkable still, Timothy was circumcised, at St Paul's bidding, after his baptism—an incomprehensible act if St Paul believed that baptism had taken the place of circumcision.

So again there is a strange absence of any reference to this alleged substitution in the Judaizing controversy. The Judaizers contended that the observance of circumcision was obligatory upon Jew and Gentile alike (Acts xv, 1 and Galatians, *passim*). If baptism had been instituted in the place of circumcision, how easily could the apostle have ended the whole dispute: "These Gentile converts are to be regarded as having received Christian circumcision when they were baptized, and therefore it is unnecessary for them to be circumcised." But St Paul did not argue so. He contended that in Christ "neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision; but faith which worketh by love" (Gal. v, 6). There is no hint in the whole discussion of any connexion between circumcision and baptism.

According to St Paul, the sacrament of baptism is a representation of the burial and resurrection of Christ and of the incorporation of the believer into Christ by dying to the past and rising again to a new life in Him: at once an acted parable and a means of grace. There is no true analogy at any point between baptism and circumcision, and the New Testament gives no hint that the one has taken the place of the other. Circumcision was one thing and baptism is quite another.

HUGH MARTIN.

"A BISHOPS' BOOK"?

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

Dr Norman Sykes, in his article "Drawing out Leviathan with a Hook", says that the Revised Prayer Book "was truly and essentially a Bishops' Book; since its compilation was the work of the episcopate . . . and the houses of clergy and laity were required to give their final vote for or against it, without possibility of amendment".

It is, of course, true, and perhaps unfortunate, that under the regulations for the conduct of business in the Church Assembly any measure touching on the services or ceremonies of the Church must be finally "either accepted or rejected by the Assembly in the terms in which it is finally proposed by the House of Bishops". In that sense the Revised Book was a "Bishops' Book".

But I feel that Dr Sykes, unintentionally perhaps, rather gives the impression that the clergy and laity had no voice in the compilation of the book. This impression is corrected by the following quotations from G. K. A. Bell's *Randall Davidson*. Dr Bell writes that, after the Bishops introduced the Revised Book into the Church Assembly in October, 1922, "for the next two years the Houses of Clergy and Laity, sitting separately, went steadily through the stage of Revision" (p. 1329). During the House of Bishops' own revision "the Bishops . . . went through the amendments of the other two Houses" (p. 1330). Finally, "on February 7, 1927, a Draft Book was presented to the Convocations. . . . The main work was done, but, in view of the large number of amendments introduced, it was felt desirable to give the Lower House the opportunity of making their own comments and suggestions before the Revised Prayer Book was submitted to the Church Assembly in its final form. . . . The Lower House met on February 22, 1927, and made a number of proposals. After a further revision in the House of Bishops the final form was presented to the Convocations, March 29 and 30, and by them commended to the Church Assembly . . ." (p. 1335). Furthermore, "the Deposited Book was not a compilation of additions and deviations by themselves but, *as desired by the House of Laity*, a Composite Book" (p. 1339; italics mine).

I am sure that Dr Sykes is aware of this. Indeed, the Archbishop of York himself in the book Dr Sykes was discussing gives a similar account (p. 212). Nevertheless I think it ought to be said if we are to

can only be called a "Bishops' Book" with certain important qualifications.

Yours faithfully,
PAUL A. WELSBY.

23, FONNEREAU ROAD,
IPSWICH.

Dr Sykes writes:

"I was aware of the facts mentioned in Mr Welsby's letter, and made an oblique reference to them by quoting Dr Garbett's statement concerning the dilatoriness of Convocational procedure. But I chose my words carefully when saying that the Deposited Book was 'truly and essentially a Bishops' Book'; and Mr Welsby's admission concerning the procedure of the Church Assembly confirms my statement. The Rule of St Benedict thus describes the relationship of the abbot to his brethren: '*audiens consilium fratrum, tractet apud se*'; which seems to me also to fit the policy of the episcopate in relation to the Deposited Book, where they heard the opinions of clergy and laity in Convocation and Church Assembly and produced their own Revision for acceptance or rejection without possibility of amendment. Therefore it seems to me that the episcopate must accept responsibility for that Book, and for those features which evoked opposition within the Church of England. It may be added that of course the bishops' meetings were private; and (if my memory serves me aright) when the Bishop of Worcester in a letter to *The Times* asked for the publication of information concerning the votes of bishops in various points of the Revision, his request was refused; so that neither clergy nor laity knew which decisions had been unanimous and which carried by slender majorities."

CALVIN

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

Principal Cunliffe-Jones has made (in your May number) three criticisms of Calvin's position as set out in my article on "Calvin and the Church of England".

1. "*There is something appallingly provincial about Calvin.*" Some months ago I visited a remote farmhouse in this parish. In talking, I asked the farmer if he didn't find it a bit out-of-the-way. He replied: "It depends where you are thinking from." Is Calvin provincial? Well, where is the capital? After all, Principal Cunliffe-Jones, as well as Calvin, may appear rather provincial when viewed from the Vatican.

2. "*Calvin never saw fully the problem of honest divergence. . . .*" Certainly. And I said the same thing: he identifies "his theology with eternal truth in rather too naïve and direct a manner". But how does that affect the rightness or wrongness of his position? It only makes him a less pleasant man and theologian than he would other-

wise have been. Objective truth can hardly be judged according to the mental state of its propounder.

3. "*He never adequately reflected upon the relation between the Word of God and the total experience of mankind.*" This is true—from Principal Cunliffe-Jones's point of view. For Calvin held, with the Bible, that the total experience of mankind is the totally perverse experience of mankind, against which the wrath of God is revealed (Rom. i) and of which He commands all men to repent (Acts xvii). It is of no positive value in the knowledge of Christ.

How "in the last resort *sola scriptura* . . . means a limited and truncated obedience to Christ" is incomprehensible to me. I only know I agree with Calvin in preferring the solid incarnate Christ of the Scriptures to this nebulous wraith who lurks in the dark wood of man's experience and tries to persuade us that his name is Christ.

I am, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
T. H. L. Parker.

Brothertoft Vicarage,
Boston, Lincolnshire.

REMEMBRANCE SUNDAY

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

I am obliged to Mr Hubbins for pointing out, what I had not known before, that there is apparently more than one form of "British Legion Service" in existence. But I think my complaint that in most places these forms of service are nearly always used in conjunction with All Saints' hymns to the exclusion of others still stands. I submit that John Riland's protest is directed not so much against the Order of the Book of Common Prayer in itself, which would always be appropriate if used over the "faithful" departed, as against the practice of the Church then, as now, of using it indiscriminately over all citizens, unfaithful or apostate as well as what he would call the "elect".

Yours, etc.,
B. C. Pawley.

BOOK REVIEWS

Thessalonians. By William Neil. Hodder and Stoughton. 10s. 6d.

Chapters in a Life of Paul. By John Knox. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press. $2.50.

The publication of this volume, whose title-page reads "The Epistle [sic] of Paul to the Thessalonians", brings to completion an undertaking which has some notable achievements to its credit. The Moffatt New Testament Commentary succeeds no more than any other series of biblical commentaries in maintaining a uniform standard throughout—like Moffatt's translation it is of considerably less

service for the Gospels than for the Epistles—but it has led the way towards a format suitable for a commentary which is to be exegetical as well as critical, eschewing the ungainly and almost unreadable Detached Note, and incorporating the treatment of important words and themes *currente calamo* into the exposition of the text. It has attempted the difficult task of attending at the same time to the religious meaning which the text had for the writer and his original readers, and to its message for the present day, and it is hardly surprising if anxiety about relevance to modern life has at times led to modernizing of the text and to moralizing and sermonizing upon it. The Moffatt commentator has been prepared to expose to view something of his own spirituality as well as his critical acumen.

Dr Neil's work provides a fitting conclusion to the series. To undertake the exposition of the Thessalonian Epistles is to be involved to the full in the unresolved problem of Christian eschatology, a subject bizarre and bewildering enough in itself, and one in which the question of relevance presses particularly hard. Dr Neil is surely a reliable guide when he insists repeatedly that Paul's interests lay primarily in the risen life of the Christian "in Christ", in his present possession of the Spirit, in his struggle with sin and in the existence of the Church, with the result that apocalyptic interests were relegated to a purely subsidiary position, and Christian truths could be detached from a framework which was proving more and more to be conventional. The matter would, perhaps, have been better left at that. Statements such as "that the early Church believed in a speedy Parousia is simply a measure of the intensity of their sense of living already in the Age to Come", or "In a sense it is always to come, in a sense it is always present, and in a sense it has already passed; this is the essence of the Old Testament Day of the Lord, the trappings are incidental", carry nothing like the same conviction as solutions of the problem as a whole. They read like modernisms, by which a rather desperate attempt is made to salvage at all costs a foreign mode of thought, to which there is, in fact, no return. The author sets out to extract as much as possible from the valuable hints which these epistles give of the apostle's missionary method and teaching and of the life of the primitive Christian community, and the omission of any reference to recent researches into patterns of catechetical teaching which may be discerned in the New Testament documents is curious, especially in view of his statement that there was a fairly clearly formulated body of moral instruction on the Christian life which was imparted to the new converts, and his assumption, which he does not elaborate, that the substance of this instruction would be the sayings of Jesus. There are smaller points one would like to discuss with him: whether Acts xvii and 1 Cor. ii really justify the conclusion that either Luke or Paul looked upon the Athens visit as a depressing failure; whether 1 Cor. iii, 9 and 2 Cor. vi, 1, both of which can be interpreted of the apostles as fellow-workers with each other, justify the judgment that to be a fellow-worker with God was a favourite Pauline idea; and whether the cause of unrest among the converts was less the loss of "loved

ones", in the modern sense of bereavement, than dismay at a plan of salvation which the death of Christians seemed to have shown to have gone awry. The quotations from Dibelius's commentary whet the appetite for more.

Dr Knox's *Chapters in a Life of Paul* is not all that its blurb writer claims for it, but in two respects it would be an admirable book with which to begin the study of Paul. In the first place it provides a useful introduction on the nature of the sources and their use. A sharp distinction is made between the Paul of the Epistles and the Paul of Acts, and the attempt is made to reconstruct the career of the apostle on the basis of the Epistles alone. The Apostolic Council is placed in A.D. 51 after Paul's missionary career is over. In the second place it provides an introduction to the chief Pauline words and ideas which is simple and clear, when modern heart-searchings are not allowed to obtrude.

C. F. Evans.

Corpus Christi College,
Oxford.

The Mystery of Faith. Book II: The Sacrifice of the Church. By Maurice de la Taille, S.J. Sheed and Ward. 25s.

Père de la Taille's work, *Mysterium Fidei de augustissimo Corporis et Sanguinis Christi Sacrificio et Sacramento. Elucidationes L in tres libros distinctæ*, was published in Paris as long ago as 1921. As its title indicates, it was written in Latin. In view of the character of the work, and of the effect which it had, and continues to have, upon the theological discussion of the Eucharist, it is perhaps surprising that no attempt was made to translate it into English until the early forties. In 1941, however, Messrs Sheed and Ward published *The Mystery of Faith. Book I: The Sacrifice of Our Lord*, which is an English translation of the first of the *tres libri*. And now in 1950 *Book II: The Sacrifice of the Church* has appeared, which is an English translation of the second. No indication is given as to how soon we may expect *Book III: The Sacrament*. But we sincerely hope that we shall not have to wait another nine years before the whole work of translation is completed.

We may, however, console ourselves with the fact that it is Père de la Taille's doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice that has been found remarkable rather than his doctrine of the Presence. And we have this in its entirety in the first two books. It is significant of his approach to the mystery that he attacks it in this way. For the Roman Catholic theologian the Eucharistic Presence has been defined much more concisely than the Eucharistic Sacrifice. The inevitable tendency has therefore always been to deal with the Presence first, and then to proceed to the Sacrifice. Père de la Taille boldly reverses the traditional order of treatment. As he himself says in the Preface to the whole work: "In this treatise I deal first with the sacrifice and then with the sacrament. . . . The reason for this will, I think, be plain when we consider how the communion is related to the sacri-

fice. . . . I have simply followed the natural order, dealing first with what came first. . . ."

In the first book Père de la Taille is mainly concerned with the relations between the Supper and the Cross and between the Cross and the Heavenly Altar. Between the Supper and the Cross he maintains, as is well known, an intrinsic unity, the one being complementary to the other. The Victim of the Passion is offered in the Supper to the immolation of the Cross. Between the Cross and the Heavenly Altar he maintains an identity of Sacrificial Victim, but not of Sacrificial Action. In this he steers a middle course between those who, like de Lugo, explicitly deny that the Christ offers Himself eternally upon the Heavenly Altar and those who, with de Condren, Olier, and later Lepin, assert that the ascended Christ eternally performs an act of sacrifice upon the Heavenly Altar.

It is against the background of this doctrine of the Sacrifice of Christ that he expounds in the second book the Sacrifice of the Church. Inevitably therefore he first deals with the relation between the Mass and the Cross and then with the relation between the Mass and the Heavenly Altar. Between the Mass and the Cross he maintains a sacramental unity, similar to, but not identical with, the unity between the Cross and the Supper. The Mass is one with the Cross, because it is the sacramental commemoration of the Cross. "The death of Christ in blood is offered in the bloodless image of His death." Between the Mass and the Heavenly Altar he maintains a direct connexion by means of the identity of the heavenly with the earthly Victim. He who once constituted himself a Victim by being offered at the Supper and immolated on the Cross is now eternally offered at the Heavenly Altar and continually offered at our earthly altars. And that which is offered in the Mass is none other than the Victim Christ of the heavenlies, in His risen, ascended, and glorified humanity.

The Anglican reader will find much in this book to admire—the width of the author's learning, the depth of his understanding, the breadth of his judgment, and the completeness of his treatment of the subject. He will probably be irritated by the way in which the evidence of *The Fathers* and *The Liturgies* is handled, as if they presupposed a homogeneous and organized theology. But he will welcome the absolute distinction between *immolatio* and *oblatio*, the insistence on the once-for-allness of the Cross, and the rejection of any notion of a new immolation of Christ, whether with de Lugo at our earthly altars, or at the Heavenly Altar with Olier and de Condren. And he will find in the quotation from Blessed Peter Canisius, which Père de la Taille takes as a summary of his own teaching, *Missæ sacrificium . . . est . . . dominicæ passionis . . . repræsentatio atque simul . . . oblatio*, a doctrine which comes very near to the familiar Anglican teaching of *Sæpius Officio, Tum vero sacrificium Crucis Patri proponimus et repræsentamus.*

A. H. Couratin.

St Stephen's House,
Oxford.

A History of Philosophy. Vol. II. Mediæval Philosophy. Augustine to Scotus. By Frederick Copleston, S.J. Burns Oates and Washbourne. 25s.

This history of medieval philosophy from Augustine to Duns Scotus will be warmly welcomed by those who already know Father Copleston from his broadcasts and contributions to learned periodicals as a scholar of wide sympathies and sound judgment. It is published in the "Bellarmine Series" and has been preceded by a volume dealing with the philosophy of Greece and Rome, which the present reviewer has not seen. The author has chosen to concentrate attention on a few important figures rather than to attempt a detailed account of the extant literature as a whole. For a catalogue of medieval thinkers and their writings the English reader must still use Prof. de Wulf's *History* in Mr Messenger's translation; the admirable sketch in two small volumes of the "Collection Payot" by Prof. Gilson has not, I think, been translated from the French.

Fr Copleston allots nine chapters to "pre-medieval influences", six of them devoted to Augustine; two to the Carolingian Renaissance, two of these to John Scotus Eriugena; to the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth centuries, five, Anselm occupying one; to the Islamic and Jewish schools and to translations from Plato and Aristotle and to works attributed to the latter, which were studied by the Latin Schoolmen, three; and, finally, thirty to the thirteenth century, whereof three are assigned to St Bonaventure, eleven to St Thomas, and six to Scotus.

It was perhaps inevitable in the circumstances that the topic of the distinction between theology and philosophy should receive somewhat more than its due share of attention, at any rate in the eyes of readers who do not recognize the infallible *magisterium* of the Roman See or feel bound to discriminate so carefully between the provinces of these two sciences as St Thomas, departing therein from the earlier "Augustinian" tradition, set the example of doing.

Fr Copleston's treatment of this matter is always fair and judicious. He is not himself a bigoted Thomist, and, while expressing "the greatest respect and reverence for the genius" of the Angelic Doctor, "does not see that anything is to be gained by confusing the finite mind of the Saint with Absolute Mind or by claiming for his system what the author himself would never have dreamed of claiming" (p. 308). In contrast with such extravagance one welcomes the remark (p. 320) that "a Thomist should expect to find fresh intellectual illumination in the pages of the modern philosophers and that he should approach them with an initial sympathy and expectancy rather than with an *a priori* suspicion, reserve, and even hostility". Fr Copleston follows Prof. Gilson in holding that St Thomas—in this, as in some other respects, treading in the footsteps of Maimonides—"gave a charter to philosophy" (pp. 7, 204, 559) which availed itself, as it was bound to do, of the liberty thus granted, to estrange itself from the background which Christians had hitherto assumed when engaged in speculation on the problems of metaphysics and ethics. But he is careful to guard against exagger-

ating the novelty of St Thomas's delimitation either by ascribing to his predecessors a conscious intention of leaving acknowledged doctrines of the Christian faith open to discussion, or by imputing to St Thomas himself any inclination to doubt that apart from revealed truth a satisfactory ultimate synthesis was impossible.

Yet, while fully endorsing the general historical correctness of Fr Copleston's exposition, one may doubt whether the whole doctrine of an infallible *magisterium*, wherever lodged, must not on grounds of reason be rejected, even at the cost of departing from the tradition of the Church, patristic as well as medieval. In that case faith would not be equated with the reception of dogmas as authoritative, much as a court of law accepts an Act of Parliament (note Fr Copleston's revealing phrase "the bare dogma" on p. 132): it would be rather a moral attitude, rational in that wider sense of reason for which the late Prof. de Burgh was constantly contending; and "revealed" theology would be distinguished from "natural", as concerned not with the perception of Divinity possible to all men through observation of external nature and of the processes of thought native to the mind of man, but with the discovery of God by men living at a particular time and place through individual persons and events.

On p. 63 some explanation of the term "ontologistic" would have been desirable for readers who, not being Roman Catholics, are not familiar with the fact that, the Holy See having censured under that name a certain doctrine (that the human intellect has an immediate cognition of God as its proper object and the principle of all its cognitions), writers on philosophy of the Roman communion are apt to be concerned with the difficult task of distinguishing theories which do from those which do not fall under that censure. On p. 215 the precise meaning of a *disputatio ordinaria* is left unexplained; the reader might have been referred to Powicke and Emden's edition of Rashdall's *Universities*, vol. i, p. 494. "The consciousness of self-existence" (p. 55) should be "the consciousness of one's own existence", "self-existence" being reserved for the sense in which it is used on p. 180 (Augustine's own words in the passage cited are *Scio me vivere*). While Fr Copleston is probably right in saying on p. 113 that John Scotus Eriugena was, for his time, an "outstanding Greek scholar", the phrase might not prepare one for, *e.g.*, his translation (more than once) of *βαρηθεὶς πέδαις* as *gravatus pueris*. Is it not misleading to speak (on p. 124) of "the Christian doctrine of creation 'in time'" in view of Augustine's insistence that time began *with* the creation? And can one rightly speak of "the transference of the imperial crown from France to Germany" (p. 137) in the tenth century? Charlemagne and Otto I were both "Franks" and nothing happened at the latter's accession comparable to the "translation from the Greeks to the Latins" which was believed in the later middle ages to have been effected by the coronation of Charlemagne. On p. 163 (ll. 11, 12, 18 from the bottom) surely "islands" should be "island"; and on p. 174, n. 2, the reference should be given as *Policrat*, 8, 21. On p. 199 Fr Copleston compares Averroes' view of

the relation of philosophy to theology with Hegel's. I should have thought that it more resembled Croce's.

The bibliography might well have included R. L. Poole's *Illustrations of Medieval Thought* and C. H. Haskins's *Mediæval Thought* and *Mediæval Culture*.

Clement C. J. Webb.

Pitchcott.

Christian Belief: A Course of Open Lectures delivered in the University of Cambridge. By Alec R. Vidler. S.C.M. Press. 10s. 6d.

To write a short account of Christian belief is a difficult task, as anyone who has tried it will agree, and that for a variety of reasons. One reason in particular is that, Christian doctrine being a closely integrated complex round a central nucleus, the writer is confronted with a dilemma: is he to deal with the central nucleus and risk the inference that the rest of the complex is non-essential, or is he to compress the whole into a too limited space? Dr Vidler has chosen the first alternative. Of his seven chapters four deal with the doctrine of God, Father, Son, and Spirit; the others offer some considerations on the Church, the forgiveness of sins and eternal life.

The moral argument for God is preferred, the writer confessing that he has never been able "to work up any interest in a First Cause". There is skilful handling of the argument against theism based on the size of the universe and the smallness of man. The chapter on Christ starts with a picture of Christian belief about A.D. 100 and discusses at some length the credibility of the apostolic testimony. Consideration of the work of the Holy Spirit ("God in action in human life") as represented in the Old Testament and the New leads to the conclusion that the Spirit's activity is made known to us by the Christian revelation as inward, permanent, corporate, and universal; and that, above all, the Spirit is now known as the Spirit of Christ with a personal character not clearly perceived before.

There is no lecture on the doctrine of the Trinity.

The treatment has the incisive vigour, the apt quotation, and the occasionally crushing aphorism which we have learnt to expect from Dr Vidler's pen. These four chapters, with their deliberately untechnical language, their candour, and their freedom from textbook dreariness, will be very useful for giving an educated inquirer an introduction to the foundations of the faith.

The chapter on the Church is shadowed by Dr Vidler's impatience with the institutional religion of our time. He admits that we cannot do without the Church and therefore undertakes to give "what strikes me as the salient information" on which the reader can base his own conclusions. The first piece of information is that the Church is "a subordinate object of Christian belief"; and the reason given is the odd one that in the creed "belief in the Church is affirmed quite a long way down". The Church is, of course, subordinate to God, as

everything is. But this glimpse of the obvious is not particularly enlightening. More important, when we are dealing with the Biblical revelation of God, is the fact that, whatever our personal reactions to the contemporary Church on earth may be, the doctrines of Christ and of the Holy Spirit cannot be stated without the doctrine of the Church. In what he goes on to say Dr Vidler virtually acknowledges this, but without stating the implications. In the Bible the purpose of God through Israel is beyond question central. The Lord Himself is at the decisive moment of history the Faithful Remnant. That which emerges from the life and death and resurrection of the Messiah is the new Israel, the Spirit-endowed Body of Christ. St Augustine was right when he said "obscurius dixerunt prophetæ de Christo quam de ecclesia" (*Enarr. in Ps. xxx*). Dr Vidler does not do justice to that "divine-human organism" set forth in the Bible when in an understandable impatience with the empirical Church he obscures the great and wholly indispensable truth of the Corpus Mysticum.

It may be that the same distrust of ecclesiasticism has influenced the chapter on forgiveness. This chapter insists upon justification "by faith alone" with an emphasis that will delight the "Reformed" theologian. But it does not grapple with the problem created by such phrases as "putting his whole confidence in the righteousness of Christ" and "growing up into the righteousness of Christ" with their obvious ambiguities.

It is characteristic of this book, "an interpretation of our existence and experience in this bewildering universe", that it ends with George Tyrrell's parable of Tenebræ; the one light of Christ "stands out luminous against the prevailing night". This is not a textbook, but a personal *confessio fidei*, the work of a mind by grace believing, by nature sceptical, independent, the sworn foe of all complacency, more inclined to say, often in scornful language, what it rejects than what it accepts. Such a writer is a valuable tonic and his book will quicken the interest of many who would not tolerate a suaver and more conventional apologetic.

H. Balmforth.

Ely.

The Christian Significance of the Old Testament. By A. J. B. Higgins. Independent Press. 8s. 6d.

This book, by the Lecturer in Biblical Theology at New College, London, while making full use of the results of modern scholarship, is intended for the general reader rather than the specialist. Its aim is to vindicate the claim of the Old Testament to be regarded as an integral and indispensable part of the Christian Bible.

The first difficulty in such a view for the average layman is the large amount of material which both strains his credulity and offends his moral sense. This issue Dr Higgins frankly faces in his opening chapters; and he deals with it with skill and understanding. Then, after surveying the use made of the Old Testament by the New

Testament writers themselves, he examines the "allegorical" method of interpretation used by early Christian writers. This method, advocated in some quarters to-day, he decisively rejects and concludes "it would be a poor look-out for the Old Testament if a large-scale return to allegorical or mystical interpretation were the only way of preserving it". Is there, asks Dr Higgins, any single theme, dominating all others, which can serve as a link uniting the Old and New Testaments?

Such a theme he finds in the missionary call, unanswered by the Church of the Old Covenant, but finally answered by the Church of the New Covenant. He sees in the Old Testament a record of salvation in four stages:

(*a*) The birth of a people out of the experience of salvation (the Exodus).

(*b*) The Covenant at Sinai. In thankfulness for salvation the people promise obedience and worship.

(*c*) The missionary vocation of the people, fully realized only in a time of suffering (the Exile).

(*d*) The people with the missionary vocation is reduced to the Servant, the Remnant which shall proclaim salvation to the people and the world.

The purpose, therefore, of Israel's election by Yahweh was that it should preach His name to the world. The Old Testament is the record, not only of its call, but also of its failure to fulfil its destiny.

Dr Higgins finds these four stages exactly paralleled in the New Testament, except that "whereas in the Old Testament record the Covenant follows the experience of salvation, in the New Testament counterpart the order is reversed: the New Covenant in the blood of Jesus Christ, ratified at the Last Supper, preceded His saving death upon the Cross."

In the light of the Resurrection experience, which turned their despair into joy, the disciples of Jesus had come to see in His death the vicarious suffering of the Servant which had atoned for their sins, and not only for theirs, but potentially, if only the knowledge of the Saviour were imparted to it, for those of the whole world. Jesus had originally intended to recall the nation to its missionary task so that it should itself become the Servant. Only when His failure to do so was seen to be inevitable did he restrict the idea of the Servant to Himself, uniquely accomplishing by His death what His life had failed to achieve. His work is continued in the proclamation by the Church of what He had accomplished. Thus the Church, the New Israel, is not merely a saved remnant, but a saving remnant, the purpose of whose call is to make disciples of all nations.

That the Church has been able to respond to its call is due to the impact of the divine personality of Jesus and its consciousness of His abiding presence through His Spirit. Thus Jesus Himself becomes the content of the Church's missionary message.

Such in brief outline is the main theme of Dr Higgins's book. He would not, I think, claim for it any great originality; but he presents his arguments in a fresh and interesting way. It is, therefore, the

greater pity that the author's style should be at times somewhat obscure. To take one instance, the meaning of such a sentence as the following is not immediately apparent: "It will be more convenient now than it would have been in the course of our examination of the methods of New Testament writers in using these passages in the various parts of the *Kerugma* to point out their original meanings."

It would, however, he ungracious to end on a critical note; for the book deserves to be widely read not only as a welcome contribution to Biblical theology, but also as a salutary warning to the Christian Church lest it too should become content to remain merely a "worshipping community".

O. Mordaunt Burrows.

Epworth Rectory,
Doncaster.

Philo's Bible. By Peter Katz. Cambridge University Press. 25s.

This is the first book to make full textual use of the critical edition of Philo's works by Cohn-Wendland, and other tools such as *The Old Testament in Greek*, edited by Brooke and McLean, and the concordance of Hatch and Redpath. Its author has long been most prominent in septuagintal studies, and it therefore commands the closest scrutiny.

Many of the quotations from the Old Testament in Philo reveal a non-septuagintal text; and it is to the problem which this poses that Dr Katz here provides a novel solution. The group of MSS which presents the aberrant text is not exclusively confined to MSS UF, as was previously supposed, and it represents a recension of the Philonic text which must have drawn upon a recension of the Pentateuch, different from that of the LXX, for its Old Testament quotations. This latter recension was no mere copy of Aquila or of a text from the *Hexapla*, but one of the greatest recensions of the LXX which has been lost. There are parallels to such a loss in the history of the text of Genesis and Ruth: indeed, Dr Katz equates the lost recension with that which included the recension R which Rahlfs had identified in Ruth. The quotations from this recension were introduced into the text of Philo, which is presented by the group of MSS concerned, in order to reintroduce the Lemmata that had been lost in the text used by the group. The sources of the group are R, which is relatively independent of Origen, "whilst using methods analogous to his", and modifications of R by the Interpolator himself, who belongs to the period from the fourth to the first half of the sixth century, which saw a renewed interest, from the Antiochene point of view, in "The Three". "In this atmosphere only could a scheme be conceived by which to revive the Alexandrian allegorical expositor and Hellenistic philosopher by a strong injection from Aquila's translation" (p. 121).

A book for specialists, its arrangement could be improved (Part III might have come first to set the problem better in its historical setting: an index of Greek and Hebrew terms would be useful), but its contents are marked by a meticulous scholarship and prodigious

industry which will be fruitful outside the purpose to which Dr Katz has employed them. On this work very few have a right to pass judgment. But we may be permitted to suggest that some of the evidence brought forward by Dr Katz would seem to point to a long targumic tradition even behind Aquila (*e.g.*, p. 100), such as T. W. Manson has argued lies behind Theodotion, so that another simpler interpretation of the quotations might be possible. And this leads us merely to state the essential issue which Dr Katz' work raises. He assumes that there is a Proto-septuagint (a special recension of which has been used in the quotations in the fourth to the sixth century). In this assumption Lagarde, Rahlfs, Orlinsky agree. But Kahle in *The Cairo Geniza* (1947) has rejected the assumption and T. W. Manson called its pursuit "a wild-goose chase" (*Dominican Studies*, April, 1949), in which case Dr Katz' work is vitiated from the start. It reopens in an acute form the problem of methodology in septuagintal studies.

W. D. Davies.

Yorkshire United Independent College, Bradford.

SHORTER NOTICES

Henri Bremond. The Life and Work of a Devout Humanist. By Henry Hogarth. S.P.C.K. 13s. 6d.

This is a book that many will open with eagerness, but at the end one knows very little more about Bremond than can be directly inferred from his writings. What comment and criticism it contains are literary and not theological. The book, in fact, largely consists of rather pedestrian summaries of, and copious extracts from, Bremond's writings, chiefly the *Literary History*. One wants to know more about the man himself, the workings of his mind, his relations with his contemporaries, and his fundamental beliefs. There is, however, a useful bibliography and an appendix which contains references to the dispute about the correctness of Bremond's interpretation of Newman. Mr Hogarth might be better informed about Roman Catholic modes of speech; for instance, he says of a book that "it contains the imprimatur of the *Non Obstat*" (p. 135), and he says that Bremond died on August 17, 1933, "on [*sic*] the Octave of Notre-Dame" (p. 153).

A. R. V.

Daniel Ernst Jablonski and the Church of England. A study of an essay towards Protestant Union. By Norman Sykes. S.P.C.K. 2s.

In his Albrecht Stumpff Memorial Lecture at Queen's College, Birmingham, in May, 1950, the Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History at Cambridge set himself to tell a story which is, or should be, of lively interest to all who have tried to follow the variegated

phases of the Reunion Movements during the past thirty years. In this country the progress of patient and painful historical research both among Anglicans and "Free Churchmen" is only gradually emancipating the religious history of the sixteenth and seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from the cramping and distorting presuppositions of nineteenth-century controversies. Those also have to be registered as part of a history which no Christian ought to regard with complacency; and the emergence of the vision of a more excellent way is still too often obscured by mists of sentiment and prejudice. Bad history is profitable for nothing, least of all as a foundation for a system of dogmatic theology or a theory of the Church. For this reason a sober and dispassionate effort to elucidate the principles underlying the resolute efforts of men like Dury and Jablonski and Leibnitz to further projects of reunion may well have value, especially when accompanied by a no less conscientious endeavour to understand and appraise the reasons for their failure.

Daniel Ernst Jablonski in a long life (1660-1741) probably succeeded in obtaining a deeper and more exact appreciation of the ecclesiastical polity of the Church of England than any other foreign theologian has ever possessed, and his attempts to secure organic union between the churches of England and of Prussia were at any rate not fairly open to the imputation of neglecting or glossing over differences, whatever may be thought of his perhaps too sanguine methods of negotiation. On the other side Dr Sykes has to try to set in relief the views not only of Archbishops such as Tenison and Wake of Canterbury and John Sharp of York, but of German and English princes such as Frederick III and I, and Frederick William I, Anne and George I, and English politicians like Raby and St John, whose personal interests were not wholly ecclesiastical. Perhaps he makes too great play with antitheses such as high churchmen and low churchmen, Tory and Whig, since religious and political labels have a disconcerting habit of not always remaining true to sample, nor, human nature being what it is, are determining motives in policy always easy to discriminate. But few readers who take his tractate in hand will fail to learn something from it or to look forward with pleasurable anticipation to the author's long-desiderated *magnum opus* on Archbishop Wake, beyond question the most important ecclesiastical statesman of his time. C. J.

Religion and the New Paganism. By John Pitts. Independent Press. 8s. 6d.

Kingdom of this World. The Challenge of Communism. By M. V. C. Jeffreys. Mowbray. 6s.

These two books deal with subjects which are becoming somewhat hackneyed, but each in its own way was worth writing. Dr Pitts, a New Jersey Presbyterian minister, is intensely interested in contemporary attempts to discredit the Christian way of thinking and living, and knows the right answers, so that his book is out-

standingly readable. He has a considerable store of apt quotations from many sorts of writers, and a particularly keen eye for the telling phrases which sum up arguments. For example, if prayer is no more than autosuggestion, it is the soul's "dumb-bell exercise"; a modern humanist is a man "without invisible means of support"; and the common excuse that Christianity has not failed because it has not really been tried is a way of saying that it has been "not the rudder that steers the ship, but simply the flag the nations fly at the mast-head".

The book really covers the fields suggested in its title: the new psychology, the new morality, the new politics, and the new humanism. The Christianity Dr Pitts presents as the alternative to these contemporary fashions is liberal orthodoxy, neither contemptuous of tradition nor obsequious to it. But he sometimes pays the price of lucidity in a certain lack of depth, and it would not be unjust to say that he presents Christianity as a way rather of thinking than of living. Professor Jeffreys has a more vivid sense of the help Christ brings to men, without which life is too much for them.

Within the limits of length it sets for itself, *Kingdom of this World* is a masterpiece. It is inspired throughout by the conviction that the fundamental beliefs of Communism are blasphemous, for they mean human self-sufficiency and a destiny confined entirely to this world. But man is not self-perfectible, and the repeated failure of his civilization is due to a profound corruption of his nature, so that he cannot of his own powers make a success of it. What is needed is not, primarily, a change of the social system by human science and cleverness, but a transformation of man's personality by God's forgiveness and grace.

Mr Jeffreys thinks that a study of Marxism should chasten complacency and strip hypocrisy. But it cannot be accepted, because it externalizes the inward truth of Christianity: the struggle of good and evil in the heart becomes the class struggle, and redemption becomes revolution. The Communist thinks in terms of process, social organization, and expediency; the Christian ought to think of persons, spiritual relations, and moral principles. He has read widely, can write forcibly, and his thinking is fundamentally unbiased. His book is not propaganda, not even theology; it is religion, thoughtfully and authentically Christian.

A. E. Baker.

Moor Monkton.

Landmarks in the History of Preaching. By Yngve Brilioth. Donellan Lectures. S.P.C.K. 2s. 6d.

English Churchmen owe a large debt to the Archbishop of Uppsala, and this sketch of the history of preaching increases it and makes us ask for a translation of his *Predikaus historia*. He finds the three essential notes of a sermon in Luke iv, 16 ff.: it is liturgical, expository, prophetic, though it may also be missionary, rhetorical, parenetic, catechetical; and he traces these three in the ancient Church, the scholastic tradition, and the Reformed sermon. He shows the influence of the Synagogue, the classical orators, neo-

platonist allegory, and comments on St John Chrysostom and St Augustine. In the middle ages there was less originality and earlier matter was served up afresh to each generation and preaching was more subservient to liturgy, but the prophetic element revived in St Bernard and in the friars, and the technique of the sermon was elaborated under the influence of the study of Aristotle. Some 150 *artes prædicandi* have been noted in which the theory and method of preaching are set forth, and quotations, illustrations, and subsidiary matter provided for the simple parish priest.

In the middle ages interest centred more on the liturgical element, and while preaching remained part of the Mass its development took place outside it, and this, while often vividly practical, often obscured and mutilated the Bible by excessive use of allegory. Coming to the Reformation the Archbishop finds Luther *sui generis* as a preacher; the scholastic tradition survived in him and his followers in contrast to the Anglicans who broke with it, while he became expositor and prophet as well. In his third lecture Dr Brilioth outlines the ways in which preaching has developed in the many varieties of Church life and worship to which the Reformation gave rise and suggests lines on which these might fruitfully be studied. (The material is too vast for one man, we think, but a team could manage it.) In some the sermon took the place of the Mass and created its own liturgical setting; with Tillotson it became a moralizing essay, to be countered by the prophetic fire of Wesley; earlier there were Calvin and Knox, and on these the Archbishop makes comment and on representative preachers in England and America down to this century; he criticizes P. Bull's *Lectures on Preaching* severely, and notes that "the most startling fact about the Anglican sermon remains the absence of a clear relation to the liturgy", reminding us of the fundamental importance of a true balance between the three essential elements. A valuable and suggestive study.

S. P. T. Prideaux.

Minehead.

The Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius of Loyola. Translated from the Spanish, with a Commentary, and a Translation of the Directorium in Exercitia by W. H. Longridge, S.S.J.E. Mowbray. 16s.

The mere reading of these Exercises is soul-scouring enough: to pursue them in full with integrity of purpose must come near the experience of being turned into another man. We expect to find rigour and fire in the founder of the Jesuit Order: what startles is the gentleness, the insight, the delicate reticence and respect for the inner freedom of the spirit, the knowledge of man's weakness, and albeit deeply veiled, the mild humour of his writings. One wonders how the course of history might have run had the later rulers of the Order maintained that "breadth of mind and liberty of spirit" which, in the commentator's words, "were so characteristic of St Ignatius and of the first Fathers of the Society of Jesus".

According to the Saint the purpose of the Exercises is to enable a man "to conquer himself, and order his life, without being influenced in his decision by any inordinate affection"—*i.e.*, to alter, or confirm himself in, his present state of life according as the will of God our Lord shall direct. The Election of the Second Week, which forms the climax of the Exercises, may, however, concern less serious decisions, such as the choices of difficulty which fall to the lot of the generality of men. And here, perhaps, the Book of the Exercises, with the Directory, and the admirable notes of Fr Longridge, may prove of unexpected usefulness to the large section of the Christian community without leisure for even the shortest retreat. For though the careful performance of the Meditations may be necessary for a good Election on so grave a matter as the adoption of the religious or the priestly life, it is conceivable that with good faith a right judgment might be reached in lesser matters through the practice of spiritual reading, through repeated bouts of prayer, particularly that kind of prayer known as the Prayer of Simplicity, and especially through the help of advice given to Directors on the Discernment of Spirits contained in the rules on that subject, in the Annotations, and also in the immensely valuable Directory added to the Exercises by the senior Fathers of the Society in 1591. The circulation of matter intended only for Directors outside the Order and Communion of the Jesuits was doubtless never contemplated by Ignatius; the fact, however, can only be a gain. Christendom would be poorer by much without it.

The production and arrangement of the book leave nothing to be desired.

J. K. Byrom.

Stockport.

A Short Introduction to the Pentateuch. By G. Ch. Aalders. Tyndale Press. 6s.

The author of this book is Professor of Old Testament in the Free University of Amsterdam and he writes from a strongly conservative standpoint. While admitting the presence in it of "Post-Mosaica" and "A-Mosaica" he claims that the legislation contained in the Pentateuch was given to Israel by Moses and that the greater part of Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy goes back to his authorship. He allows for a later compiler or series of editors, but argues that the Pentateuch reached its present form not later than the first seven years of the reign of David, possibly even in that of Saul.

The book is really an attack on the Graf-Wellhausen "documentary hypothesis", and it must be admitted that Dr Aalders presents his case with learning and persuasiveness. He will not agree that the use of the Divine names reveals diversity of authorship, nor will he agree that double narratives exist, even in the Creation accounts in Gen. i and ii. He argues that Deuteronomy does not necessarily identify priests and Levites, but that the expression "the priests, the Levites" may mean no more than priests who happen to

belong to the tribe of Levi. Nor, he claims, does the Deuteronomic insistence on a Central Sanctuary conflict with Exod. xx, 24: at most that passage "refers to a multiplicity of altars". But surely an altar implies a Sanctuary.

The Documentary hypothesis has been under fire for the last fifty years, but Dr Aalders' book is on too slight a scale to compel its adherents to beat a retreat: its 18 chapters cover only 158 pages, of which the first 22 are concerned with a historical survey of Pentateuchal Criticism. Some of his suggestions are more ingenious than convincing—*e.g.*, that Moses wrote an itinerary of the wanderings and recorded the main events, that a copy of the "Balaam Songs" may have been recovered from his dead body by the victorious Israelites.

The prospective reader should understand that the author holds very firmly to a "Fundamentalist" view of Holy Scripture and proclaims his belief that every incident recorded there actually occurred exactly as related—*e.g.*, Eve was formed from part of Adam's body, the serpent really spoke to her, and so on. Dr Aalders' book will doubtless appeal to those who share this outlook, but will hardly convince those who hold a different view of Inspiration.

O. Mordaunt Burrows.

Epworth.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

Abingdon-Cokesbury Press: Frederick C. Grant, *An Introduction to New Testament Thought* ($3.75).

Blackfriars: *The Spirit of Unity* (3s. 6d.); Ferdinand Valentine, O.P., *The Lord we Serve* (7s. 6d.).

Church Historical Society (Philadelphia): Samuel Clyde McCulloch (Ed.), *British Humanitarianism* ($4.00).

Edinburgh House Press: Edwin W. Smith (Ed.), *African Ideas of God* (21s.).

Editions du Temps Présent (Paris): *Unité chrétienne et tolérance religieuse* (A symposium) (300 frs).

Longmans (Dorchester): Philip Raymond, *Divine Healing: What the Bible Miracles Teach* (1s. 6d.).

Longmans Green and Co.: John Baillie, *The Human Situation* (2s. 6d.).

Mowbray: St Bernard (Trans.: A Religious of C.S.M.V.), *On the Love of God* (3s. 6d.).

S.C.M. Press: J. H. Oldham, *Work in Modern Society* (3s. 6d.); Harry Emerson Fosdick, *The Man from Nazareth* (12s. 6d.); A. M. Hunter, *The Work and Words of Jesus* (12s. 6d.).

Sheed and Ward: John Coventry, S.J., *The Breaking of Bread* (10s. 6d.); Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediæval Philosophy* (18s.). [The first edition of this book was reviewed in Theology, April, 1936, by Dr E. L. Mascall.]

S.P.C.K.: J. H. Srawley (Ed.), *St Ambrose on the Sacraments and on the Mysteries* (10s. 6d.); A. E. Morris, *The Problem of Life and Death* (3s. 6d.); Arthur E. Henderson, *Glastonbury Abbey, Then and Now* (2s. 6d.); Maurice G. Tucker, *John Neville Figgis* (10s. 6d.).

Stuart and Richards: Maurice Nicoll, *The New Man* (15s.).

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